INTRODUCTION

A. Deciding Who Dies
THURGOOD. The sad and simple truth is that this Court failed in 1972. Furman should have decided once and for all that the death penalty is unconstitutional.' WILLIAM. But it didn't. It decided only that executions had to stop. until certain supposed problems were solved.' Although all the Justices in the majority shared a discomfort with how the penalty was being administered, each one had his own idea of how, precisely, the Constitution was implicated, and only you and the elder William were prepared to find it unconstitutional per se. I dissented, but it was four years later, in Gregg, that this Court went truly wrong. The question before us was whether the penalty was constitutional for murder. We said it was.' But then, for some unhappy and unprincipled reason, we proceeded to claim the consti-tutional authority to promulgate the following hopelessly impractical limitations on its use: The state could not automatically kill everyone, or randomly kill just anyone 4 convicted of a capital offense-some procedure had to guide the sentencing decision in some way, 5 and had to allow consideration of mitigating factors.' Suddenly we were in the business of telling states exactly how they could administer a penalty we told them was fully constitutional. 7 JOHN PAUL. Both of you oversimplify." Gregg and its companion cases held that the penalty was a constitutional sanction for murder, but not for every murder. 9 The problem recognized in Furman was that getting the penalty in America was like being struck by lightning-random, freakish, with no way to predict who would get it and no criteria for deciding who should. 10 As our brother Potter observed, "of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."" Furman mandated that the sentencer's discretion be limited and guided to prevent this kind of arbitrary and capricious action. 1 2 The simplest way to limit discretion would, of course, have been to make the penalty mandatory upon conviction of capital crimes, but we rejected that in Woodson because of strong 7. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983) (plurality opinion) (arguing that state may decide to execute whomever it desires, provided she has been properly convicted of capital crime and sentenced under procedures which suggest decision will not be so wholly arbitrary as somehow to violate Constitution); Wainwright v. Spenkelink, 442 U.S. 901, 903 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of motion to vacate stay of execution). ) for proposition that judges in capital cases may feel compassion but must "strive against scruples that may tend to enervate decision").
9. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (" [T] he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.") with Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295-99 (overturning statutes mandating death for all firstdegree murderers because death no longer viewed as appropriate for substantial portion of such murderers). See also Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 708 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Eighth Amendment precludes death penalty where crime did not reflect more depravity than that of "any person guilty of murder"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 n.15 (1982) (citing precedent for need to limit capital punishment to "worst" cases).
10. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89. 11. Id. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 12. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
evidence that "under contemporary standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers."' 3 Since the states cannot and do not execute all murderers, it is indispensable, both morally and legally, that they have a principled justification for executing the few they do. We therefore, of necessity, required unique sentencing procedures in capital cases that would ensure a rational decision on who would die. And it has worked. 4 STUDENT. Just what do you mean by "rational" here? JP. A rational sentencing decision is one based on objective, standardized criteria, the use of which makes the decision susceptible to review by higher courts, and promotes consistent results in comparable cases.1 5 This reads "rational" as the antonym of "arbitrary," which denotes a decision made according to whim or caprice, under improper procedures. 6 The sine qua non of a rational sentencing scheme is that it provide a principled way to distinguish the few cases in which the penalty is actually imposed from the many in which it is not." STU. Do you really mean that? JP. Absolutely. I am convinced that the Constitution requires that "any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."' 18 , citing Barclay, 463 U.S. at 938 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting "constitutional duty" to ensure rationality); see also Weisberg, supra note 6, at 318-22 (comparing this "romantic" due process approach in capital sentencing to "classical" approach exemplified by Justice Harlan's view in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) , that standards could not be formulated).
STU. This claim is one that I am very eager to pursue. I know that Thurgood says no one may be executed, and William says that anyone fairly convicted of capital murder may be executed, but knowing the positions they have taken based on the per se constitutionality of the penalty hasn't helped me understand how the death decision is actually made under Gregg and its progeny. And yet, executions are taking place at the rate of one or two per month. 9 If you can convince me that you have enforced a system that ensures that only a particularly heinous subclass of the large class of death eligible murderers is selected for execution, I would at least have to admit that you offer a way to reconcile values of civilized rationality and fairness with the horror of taking life.
B. The Penalty, the Constitution and the Difference of Death
JP. I should begin with Gregg, and explain why simply finding the penalty unconstitutional is not a legitimate way out. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishments as defined by society's "evolving standards of decency." '2 0 In assessing the evolution of decency in Gregg and its companion cases, we looked to the thirty-five states that swiftly passed new penalty statutes after Furman, at juries that continued to hand down death sentences, and at other indicia of contemporary views on the penalty. 21 It was obvious that there had been no general moral rejection of the penalty, and my brother Thurgood, in dissent, could only support the opposite conclusion by arguing that society's moral standards had evolved past the penalty without society's knowing it.
22 Of course, the mere fact that a penalty has popular approval does not insulate it from constitutional scrutiny. The Eighth Amendment also requires that a punishment not be excessive, 23 meaning, first, that it can't be grossly out of proportion to the crime being punished, and second, that it has to achieve some rational purpose that can't be served by a lesser sanction. 2 4 Since it is apparent that death is not a disproportionate punishment for intentional murder, 5 the major issue was the purposes the penalty might serve; the plurality opinion I joined in Gregg gave two. The first was retribution: "In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function . . . is essential in an ordered society that asks citizens to rely on legal process rather than selfhelp to vindicate their wrongs. "26 THUR. Evidently, the penalty is all that stands between us and frontier justice.
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JP. The other major purpose we noted was deterrence.
THUR. "Noted" may exaggerate the weight of your plurality's attention to that particular purpose. You did no more than declare that legislatures were better suited than courts to undertake the kind of fact-finding that would determine the deterrent value of punishments. guide it through the death decision. The new statutes we approved in Gregg and subsequent cases did this. The judge and jury are provided lists of aggravating and mitigating factors which the state, representing organized society, regards as important to the decision to impose death or not. 9 The sentencer must consider the particular circumstances of the crime and the criminal, and evaluate them according to clearly elucidated standards.
4 0 Specifically, the decision to impose death requires a sequence of independent determinations. 41 First, a sentencer must find at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before a convicted murderer is even eligible for death.' 2 If at least one is found, the sentencer goes on to weigh all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine (6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense . . . was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. whether or not death is the appropriate penalty. 43 The jury should have no reasonable doubts regarding its decision." STU. I'm still not sure I understand how, and how thoroughly, the standards guide the sentencer's discretion. JP. They genuinely shape deliberations to prevent unbridled discretion. 45 As we wrote, "[n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines." 46 STU. "Circumscribed" would seem to imply that within the boundaries set by the guidelines there may still be unbridled discretion. JP. Not at all. There will always be discretion 4 " in the sense that a sentencer uses judgment in applying controlling standards. There may even be a slightly stronger species of discretion, the freedom to come to a decision that diverges from that which the standards would normally tend to support-discretion to grant mercy despite a preponderance of aggravating circumstances is constitutional, even desirable. 48 But there is most certainly not the kind of discretion rejected in Furman, the discretion to choose the standards themselves, if any, and to apply them without any possibility of review. 49 No, "guided discretion" means "controlled discretion": the standards go right into the jury room to create a structure for deliberations." STU. The difference between your position and William's would seem to entail a different role for guiding factors, and that's what I'm trying to get at. You both require one aggravating circumstance to establish death eligibility. I can envision a jury going down the list and seeing if any apply; and, for the purposes of this conversation, let's assume that juries do establish death eligibility in a reliable, consistent fashion. But at that point, the jury has done all that William asks of it: The class is narrowed. You would have it do more. You require the jury to use the guidelines in a rational and coherent way right through to the end of the death decision. It's harder to imagine that working. JP. This is how we described it in Gregg:
43. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 961; Smith, 459 U.S. at 1057-58; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193; see also Gillers, supra note 16, app. at 102 n.* ("Generally, the sentencer is instructed to. . . 'weigh' the two and to impose death only if the aggravating circumstances 'outweigh' the mitigating ones."); Weisberg, supra note 6, at 350 (jury's use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances "usually conceived as a weighing or balancing process").
44. 
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These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime: Was it committed in the course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or a judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: Does he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate [sic] against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime)[?] As a result, while some jury discretion still exists, "the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application.1
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The guidelines were designed to shape the jury's deliberations in a positive manner, and were understood to do so. "Thus," concluded the Florida Supreme Court, "the discretion charged in [Furman] can be controlled and channeled until the sentencing process becomes a matter of reasoned judgment rather than an exercise in discretion at all." 5 2 So you see, as we wrote in Gregg, "[n]o longer should there be 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'-"3 We have made the decision rational. STU. Not so fast. That's a fine description of a platonic jury deliberation, but it doesn't support the proposition that you need to establish if you want us to accept guiding circumstances as guarantors of rationality. You have guidelines, but having led your horse to water, can you assume it is drinking? 5 4 JP. We "assume" juries will follow instructions of law, for example. WILL. I won't accept that from you, who like nothing better, where "death is different," than to assume that juries won't behave. You rejected mandatory penalty statutes in large part because, you said, too many juries would acquit defendants regarded as guilty but undeserving of Anyway, John Paul, you're the one trying to establish that discretion is "controlled" right through the actual decision to impose the penalty.
schemes "may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act lawlessly"); id. at 314 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (juror violation of oath "not only consistent with the majority's hypothesis; the majority's hypothesis is bottomed on its occurrence" We've reached a dead end, but for now we'll grant you that juries do consistently use the circumstances they've found. The next problem is that some of these circumstances are such that I doubt if we may speak of "finding" them in the familiar factual sense. It appears to me that you have two classes of aggravating circumstances. 9 Some, like "the victim was a policeman in the line of duty," are very much like the factual elements of a crime. Even if the jury is free to weigh them as it sees fit, the finding of them should be fairly objective. Then there are some factors which require considerable subjectivity even in the finding. Many states have aggravating circumstances like Georgia's, asking whether the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," 60 or Florida's, asking whether the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 1 JP. The criminal law constantly requires fact-finders to use their trained or instructed judgment in applying difficult concepts like premeditation and recklessness in the guilt decision. THUR. But is that good enough? After all, death is different. 62 STU. Let's say there is a continuum, beginning with "A killed B," moving through "A intentionally killed B, a policeman in the line of duty," to "A killed B, a policeman in the line of duty, in a manner that was outrageously wanton and vile, showing a depraved mind." At some point on that line, you can no longer speak of a "correct" decision, and so your rational criteria become "pseudo-standards." You can be right or wrong about whether A killed B, but not about whether A's mind was depraved, because that presupposes a line that doesn't exist. 6 3 Essentially, if the jury "finds" depravity-and even courts have conceded that most killings will appear heinous and vile to the average juror 8 4 -then it's a "fact" and the question of rationality is begged. conscious or unconscious prejudice will creep in. When you ask "How heinous is it to kill a cop?" a juror might end up answering "How heinous is it for a poor Latino to kill a middle-class white cop?" 5 JP. That kind of discrimination has yet to be proven. 6 But regardless, courts have strictly interpreted the guidelines. 6 " For example, Florida defined "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" as a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." 6 " STU. It doesn't help when you ask me to imagine an efficient killer who uses only necessary torture. THUR. If they're so narrowly defined, why is it that heinousness is the circumstance that juries find most often-in over 82% of Florida's capital cases, for example?" JP. You'd expect that, if the system narrows the pool of capital crimes to the very worst. And the studies you refer to also show that the likelihood of getting the penalty increases as more aggravating circumstances are found. In Georgia, for example, 79% of death sentences are imposed on defendants whose cases involved three or more." 0 THUR. But of that group of defendants with three or more identical aggravating circumstances, only 62% were sentenced to death. 7 1 It's not enough to show that defendants with several aggravating circumstances get the penalty more often than those with one; you have to supply a principled way to explain why so many defendants with the same circumstances get different sentences. WILL. He can't. I won't say I told you so, John Paul, but our brother 65. See C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 98-102 (race and poverty likely to warp exercise of discretion); Bowers, 1417-18 (1985) ; see also Baldus, supra note 13, at 698-99 (Georgia's "wanton and vile" or enumerated contemporaneous offense aggravators found in about 85% of sample capital cases); cf Liebman, supra note 67, at 1439, 1463 n.139 ("wanton and vile" sole aggravating factor in 20% of cases).
70. Baldus, supra note 13, at 699. 71. Id. at 699-703.
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Harlan did. Way back in McGautha v. California he wrote that it was "beyond present human ability" to contrive usable standards that would identify in advance all the salient characteristics of a death-deserving felony. 7 Your plurality's opinion in Gregg had the temerity to suggest that this genuine wisdom had been "undermined by subsequent experience. ' ' , 3 But what's obviously been undermined by subsequent experience is your romantic notion of all but perfectly consistent, rational jury decisions through guided discretion. John Paul, you know this. It's the reason you wrote Zant.
B. Guided Discretion Falls
STU. I don't think you've established that guided discretion allows a principled definition of the subclass of death eligible murderers who are actually sentenced to death. Zant v. Stephens 4 makes me wonder if that remains your goal. The question in the case was whether a sentence based in part upon invalid aggravating circumstances could stand, and the answer turned on whether aggravators were required to serve any function beyond the establishment of death eligibility. 7 5 You were dealing with the same Georgia statute your plurality had explicated in Gregg, but your vision of guided discretion had changed. JP. No it hadn't. We'd always thought of guided discretion as describing a process that begins with all killers and ends with those few murderers actually sentenced to die. In Zant, we merely adopted Georgia's portrayal of this process as the ascent of a four-level pyramid, in order to clarify the role of aggravators at various points in the decision.
7 ' An accused killer starts at the pyramid's base. The trial of guilt or innocence determines whether he or she will rise to the second level; those convicted of capital murder go up, while those acquitted or convicted of lesser crimes like manslaughter stay put. STU. What discretion does the jury exercise in this first decision? JP. The minimal discretion of the guilt decision: Have the elements of the crime-like premeditation-been proven beyond a reasonable doubt? STU. So JP. The jury weighs all the aggravating and mitigating factors, whether listed by statute or not, and then decides whether to raise the murderer to the last level, composed of the few upon whom a sentence of death is actually passed. STU. The jury's consideration isn't limited to the statutory aggravating factors? JP. No. In Georgia, other than establishing death eligibility, the finding of aggravating circumstances "does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion." ' STU. Oh, I see. So, conversely, even if it has found many aggravators, a jury doesn't have to sentence a defendant to death? JP. Right. "There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the [top level] and not impose death." '79 STU. Then it must follow that the jury also has "absolute" discretion to place a case onto the top level and impose death. JP. Well, yes, in the sense that the jury itself draws that final line, though it is guided in that it can only lift a defendant onto the final level if it is justified by the totality of the evidence. 80 STU. Earlier, you said that "guided" discretion meant discretion "controlled" by clear, objective standards. JP. Yes. STU. Are you saying now that a killer climbs to the fourth level by a process of "controlled absolute" discretion? That's a paradox. Zant held that a sentence based in part on invalid aggravators could stand as long as a valid one remained to establish death eligibility. 81 JP. So? STU. So, in a word, that's the problem with Zant. The distinction between who may get the penalty and who may not is death eligibility. We've conceded (for discussion) that your system draws that line in rational fashion. The problem posed by a liberal reading of Furman and Gregg-the problem you set for yourself when we began-is to distinguish rationally between death eligible murderers who are sentenced to death and death eligible murderers who are not. JP. The guidelines promote particularized consideration of the offender and the offense. 9 2 Beginning with Gregg, we stressed the importance of providing the sentencer with as much information as possible under fair procedures. 93 Once the Georgia jury has found the circumstance establishing death eligibility, the system allows it to consider all the relevant factors.
STU. It appears, John Paul, to allow them to consider all factors period, including things you say it oughtn't, like race."' But even were it otherwise, ensuring that a jury will examine a problem closely does not provide standards by which it may distinguish rationally between identically situated murderers, only some of whom may properly be executed. WILL. The premise of a highly individualized process is that no two crimes and criminals are alike. 95 It follows that there is no speaking of "identically situated murderers." 9 " JP. That's nihilistic. Taking that position would mean there never could be standards.
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WILL. There's no pleasing this man. STU. If, John Paul, you were arguing that the procedures now in place make the jury less arbitrary than it was before Furman, perhaps you could make a case. You might even be able to convince a lot of people of William's persuasion that virtually no one ends up in the death eligible class whom it would be capricious to execute. But if that's not good enough for you, you must provide some criterion that governs the actual decision to impose death. JP. All right, I think I can do that. Florida, 98 I dissented from an opinion upholding Florida's unique system of advisory jury verdicts, under which a judge may impose final sentence of life or death regardless of the jury's chosen sentence." 9 The reason for my vote was simple; in a way, perhaps I was shedding some of the rationalizations that had crept into the doctrine of rational sentencing. The question of whether the penalty is the appropriate punishment in response to the particular circumstances of the case depends on the degree to which a death eligible defendant deserves retribution. 00 "Thus . . .capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment-an assessment of . . . the 'moral guilt' of the defendant." 10 1 Since it is "ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live-I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single governmental official." ' 2 STU. But just why can't judges pass on this "moral entitlement" we call life? JP. A judge can't represent a community's values-can't maintain the link "between contemporary community values and the penal system ... without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' " 1 3 -in the way a jury can. And, because it is the product of outrage, death "is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally understand such rules." 10 STU. But all through this conversation you've been arguing that death can be prescribed by rules of law. What else is guided discretion? Outrage sounds more like emotion (if not caprice) than reason. How does it supply an objective criterion for distinguishing those who die from those who don't? JP. Those sentenced to death are the ones who spark the jury's outrage. said so. Why did the jury say so? Because Joe deserves the ultimate retribution. It's the sparking of the outrage you need to rationalize. JP. But here, at last, McGautha 0 6 is on my side. Our brother Harlan noted that capital sentencing was premised on the belief "that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision." ' 10 7 We recently observed that this sense of awesome responsibility has allowed us to see discretion as compatible with, even indispensable to, "the Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' "108 Jurors are informed by the statutory factors and guided, one could say, by a sort of "intuitive moral rationality." 0 9 STU. So the principled standard is, "This killer makes us mad"? JP. I'll admit that outrage doesn't exactly square with my initial description of a rational sentencing criterion. But outrage is a proper response, as long as retribution is a rational purpose of punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 1 0 By identifying those whose acts and character convince a cross section of the community that their acts deserve the ultimate sanction,-it supplies a principled way to distinguish between the merely death eligible and the death sentenced. STU. We've allowed that retribution is a rational purpose. We'll even grant you that your juries gravely-dispassionately? coolly?-assess their own outrage. You've ended up defining guided discretion as the use of guidelines which, although they are not binding after death eligibility, and do not begin to cover the whole range of outrageous acts, 1 ' do in some fashion tell a jury what it may get steamed about. Is that really good enough to ensure that any decision to impose the penalty "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion"? 1 2
D. Post-Mortem
STU. I think you must give it up. You still write of "the sort of considered community judgment the Court has approved in the past,"' 1 3 but by basing the decision on outrage you've left the world of objective standards. You retreat past Gregg, past Furman, perhaps even past McGautha. It may be quite realistic to say that the decision to impose death is ultimately emotional, but it shreds your vision of rationally applied standards. It may force you to adopt William's position." 1 4 (Although even seeing the aggravators as a narrowing device for death eligibility, I find it hard to picture a jury which coolly decides whether an aggravator has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and then gets outraged.) JP. The problem is that the trial just couldn't do the job alone-but I never really asked it to. This conversation has been skewed because we haven't talked about half the equation, appellate review. The thrust was always that the system as a whole achieve rationality, and I still think the system as a whole can provide a principled way of distinguishing between the death eligibles who do and do not actually get the penalty. 1 15 After Zant and Spaziano, I no longer seek that rationality in the decision to impose death at trial. Instead, I regard the trial decision as testing the retributive utility of the sentence, and rely on the cooler-headed process of appellate review to ensure that the jury's decision, despite its emotional basis, makes rational sense. STU. You have not been able to provide a principled way of determining why those who commit comparable crimes do not get comparable sentences. In Spaziano, you supplied a simple reason for this failure: Turning your Gardner dictum on its head, you said the decision to impose death is based on emotion-to wit, outrage-rather than reason. Now you are apparently going to argue that outrage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the imposition of the penalty, solely within the province of the jury to establish. Reason is still required, but it is to be understood as coming exclusively from the process of review. JP. Without insisting on any particular appellate procedures, I've always felt "that some form of meaningful appellate review is an essential safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences." 17 THUR. You tell us of what the review is made; we'll tell you if it's meaningful. STU. First we need a clearer characterization of the posture of capital review. I understand that, formally, the trial sentence is presumptively correct, and the appellate court reviews to correct error." 1 8 Such mere sufficiency testing can't be what you mean by "meaningful" review, since there is no rationality to "review" in a nonrational decision. 9 I presume, then, that "meaningful" review is independent not just in the sense that it is carried out by a different court, but also in the sense that it involves a de novo sentencing process, in which the jury's decision is regarded only as an indicator of outrage. JP. I'm not convinced that de novo sentencing is necessary. Execution normally takes place only after a direct appeal, a clemency hearing, and one or more rounds of state and federal collateral review. 20 Obviously, the selection is not rational merely because hearings are numerous, but there is a sense that a fair, thorough process will eventually yield correct results. 2 ' STU. The problem is not whether enough people pay enough attention to the case, but whether anyone applies rational criteria to the ultimate death decision. THUR. It gets worse: This whole idea of serial review by successive courts diffuses responsibility. When everyone believes that someone else has the ultimate authority, there is an unacceptable risk that no one will take personally the awesome responsibility for determining sentence.
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WILL. The ultimate objection is that this theory would require us to treat habeas corpus proceedings and certiorari to this Court as matters of right. We'd be admitting that it takes our judicial system several tries to reach the proper result, and we'd be institutionalizing the current penalty stalemate. Despite your passion for review, John Paul, even you have never 124. See Gillers, supra note 42, at 1091 n.360; Liebman, supra note 67, at 1464 ("[T]he Georgia court . . .appears to do less than a truly 'independent assessment' of the evidence, preferring to affirm the conclusion of the jury in the language of the legislature.").
125. The court compares all past murder cases with the case before it to determine if the sentence is excessive. If a certain kind of murder rarely or never draws a death sentence, the court may infer that such a sentence would offend evolving standards of decency. 13 0 That seems to me to be a pretty objective standard of outrage. THUR. It doesn't happen that way, though. Any claim that courts look at "all" murder cases is hyperbole. 1 Since they actually look at only a few cases, the crucial issue is how courts select '!similar" cases to compare. 1 32
They cannot use statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, because for every combination there are substantial numbers of both life and death sentences. 1 3 An extremely rigorous and systematic analytical approach, based on distinguishing elements of the crime whether statutorily noted or not, might work. 18 4 That, however, is pretty hard work, and what courts doing proportionality review have actually done is adopt a standardless, anecdotal categorization of "similar" cases drawn from their own past capital docket. This means, among other things, that the sample will not include comparable cases which resulted in life sentences.' 35 Ultimately, you have to face hard truths: State high courts have rarely overturned sentences on proportionality grounds-indeed, some courts have never done it 1 3 -and, since Pulley, we don't even require them to try. 1 37 STU. But even if Thurgood's objections were answered, comparative proportionality is neither a source of rational standards nor even necessarily probative of rationality. What it tells you is the statistical distribution of jury outrage across the range of fact patterns. Since we have not yet established the rationality of the death sentences in any one of those cases, we cannot claim to have done so simply because we have differentiated among them. When you reverse a sentence on proportionality grounds, it's not because the decision was irrational-though it might have been-but bethe time" in capital cases not good enough).
128. STU. But on review as at trial, even the most exacting assessment of an offender and offense doesn't provide standards for the death decision. Even after all the information is assembled and arranged and counted and compared and contrasted and weighed, the question remains, by what principled standards will the judge pass a sentence of life or death, and how will she distinguish this defendant from the many comparable defendants who received the other sentence? JP. Even a student of the law, allowed the luxury of judgment without its responsibilities, must accept that real judges are required to exercise discretion-in short, to judge. Finally, even the most theoretically pure rules are neither self-explanatory nor self-applying. 1 4 0 I approach the decision to impose the penalty as Justice Frankfurter approached the definition of due process:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. 141 You cannot expect-you surely cannot even desire-that this most grave of sanctions be imposed by judges dispassionately weighing a few specified factors according to an inflexible system on the scales of blind justice. We had better be bringing quite a bit more than that to bear on this tragic decision. At some point, to distinguish properly those who are killed from those who are spared, someone must consider their culpability as broadly as possible, considering our laws, our national values, our reason and our duty. That's what judges are trained for. It's our job. 14 1 STU. That's it? Judges personify rational standards? "Meaningful appellate review" is review by an appellate judge? JP. Well, if you won't trust judges to exercise discretion, you're not saying that the penalty is irrational, you're saying it's impossible.
WILL. & THUR. Exactly.
IV.
CONCLUSION: THE END STU. It won't work, John Paul. You justify the regulated penalty as a means of punishing the worst, but the worst are none other than those who are killed. Your guiding standards do not guide; in fact, it is quite possible that those identified by the current system as the "worst" are those already identified by a prejudiced society as the "ugly," the "alien" or the "despised." Maybe effective guidance is impossible, and maybe not, but it is hard to understand your Spaziano dissent as anything other than an exhausted confession of failure. After you say the decision is a reflexive reaction to outrage, what is left to guide? JP. I set myself a difficult task, but what were the alternatives? I couldn't avoid the conclusion that the penalty was constitutional for heinous killers, yet, unlike some Justices, I could not reject the assertion that the penalty was being imposed on "only a random assortment of pariahs.
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That left us no choice but to promote standards that would guide the decision away from the kind of considerations that led to random-or prejudiced-selection, and toward unbiased and consistent identification of the worst, most deserving murderers. If guided discretion hasn't worked, it is not necessarily because it was a bad idea. For one thing, there was too much political maneuvering. I tried to be rational, but Thurgood and William wouldn't even be reasonable. I am held to an impossibly high standard of rationality, but undercut at every step. Thurgood keeps reminding us with formulaic citations to his abolitionist opinions that he 142. For evidence that appellate judges do not bring a special seriousness to the death process, and may even bring a special haste, see Goodpaster, supra note 115, at 794 & n.64; Liebman, supra note It would be an odd step for you, John Paul. If you give up on eliminating absolute discretion, and concede that "the worst" is a broad enough category to encompass any death eligible mu'rderer, you lose the basis for the crucial constitutional distinction your plurality drew between the arbitrariness condemned in Furman and the rationality proclaimed in Gregg and Woodson.
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JP. I could also join Thurgood, and conclude that the penalty is unconstitutional. Not, of course, because it offends common decency in and of itself, but rather because it cannot be applied without arbitrariness and caprice. WILL. I frankly don't see you as a born-again abolitionist. STU. But it would be a reasonable step if you felt unwilling to risk a penalty scattered randomly on pariahs. JP. Or I could keep trying to foster effective guidelines. It still seems to me perfectly reasonable-unimpeachable-to recognize that, while society cannot kill anyone it likes, courts cannot refuse society's manifest desire to kill a carefully selected few. There must be a principled way to identify them, and states can be required to find it. Of course, it would mean voting with Thurgood until they do. 
